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Article
Selective tolerance
and the radical right
Colin Jennings and
Elizabeth Ralph-Morrow
King’s College London, UK
Abstract
In recent decades, there has been increased tolerance within many countries
towards a range of previous out-groups. This has been displayed most dra-
matically in the growing acceptance of the LGBT community. Some radical
right organisations are also expressing tolerance towards the very same out-
groups which they once reviled. We postulate that the radical right strate-
gically uses tolerance to increase its own support and to impose costs on
another out-group – Muslims – who are judged to be hostile to the toler-
ated groups. We provide a theoretical analysis and contrasting case studies
that help explain the conditions under which radical right organisations will,
or will not, display tolerance towards out-groups.
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Introduction
In recent decades, there has been increased tolerance within many
countries towards a range of groups. This is most dramatically
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displayed in the increasing acceptance of the LGBT community, but it
can also be seen in reduced racism, anti-Semitism and sexism. Radical
right political parties and organisations are also increasingly espousing
tolerance towards some of these previous out-groups. Recent years
have seen the ‘detoxification’ of France’s Front National (now
National Rally) by leader Marine Le Pen which has led the party to
advocate for gay rights and adopt a more liberal position on abortion.
At the same time, however, the Front National adopted a more hostile
stance towards Islam (Mayer, 2013, 2015). This approach has arguably
assisted the competitiveness of the party in French elections as social
values appear to take on more prominence than the traditional eco-
nomic left/right divide in politics (Facchini and Jaeck, 2019). In the
Netherlands, openly-gay Pim Fortuyn led a populist movement calling
for an end to Muslim immigration before his assassination in 2002 and
the political space he occupied has since been filled by Geert Wilders’
Party for Freedom, which similarly combines tolerance towards
women’s rights, LGBT people and Jews with hostility towards Islam
(Akkerman, 2005; Vossen, 2011). In the United Kingdom, the radical
right, anti-Islam street protest organisation, the English Defence
League (EDL), has LGBT, Sikh and Jewish divisions, and rainbow
and Israeli flags have been displayed at its marches as protestors
launch hostile, abusive chants at Muslims (Meadowcroft and
Morrow, 2017; Pilkington, 2016). Increasingly, it seems that radical
right parties and organisations in North-western Europe are voicing
their support for liberal principles while simultaneously rejecting
Muslims on the grounds of their allegedly illiberal values (see
Simonsen and Bonikowski, 2020).
This change of attitude towards groups who were previously a
target of radical right organisations is usually understood to be a stra-
tegic decision aimed at increasing and retaining popular support. It is
argued that publicly supporting the rights of women, Jews and LGBT
people enables the radical right to signal its rejection of biological
racism and fascism and thereby broaden its appeal beyond the small
number of people comfortable with more extreme views. Numerous
scholars have noted that radical right organisations that have dis-
tanced themselves from biological racism and fascism have successfully
mobilised significant numbers of people to vote or take to the streets
in their support, whereas those that have not taken steps towards
detoxification have failed to achieve similar success (Golder, 2003;
Goodwin, 2011; Mayer, 2015).
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A stereotypical radical right group would ideally choose to express
intolerance towards a range of out-groups as this would cement a
narrow and clearly defined group identity. In Western countries, that
identity could be White, predominantly male, heterosexual and
Christian. However, the group also wishes to maintain sufficient mem-
bership to be socially and politically relevant. It may be that in some
societies intolerant views are not stigmatised, and in these societies,
one should expect to see broadly intolerant radical right groups.
However, in societies where sexism, racism and homophobia are stig-
matised, the adoption of a more tolerant stance that reduces the costs
of stigma will help to maintain and expand membership. At the same
time, such an approach risks undermining the very raison d’etre of a
radical right group; if tolerance is extended too broadly, the existential
purpose of a radical right organisation ceases. This is because the
organisation would no longer be able to uphold the xenophobia and
nationalism that, along with the punitive moralism of authoritarian-
ism, render it ‘radical right’ (Mudde, 2007). Therefore, the twin tasks
of maintaining and extending membership, while also maintaining the
intolerance that the group requires, is achieved by focusing attention
primarily on one out-group and currently this is the Muslim commu-
nity. Reducing stigma through tolerance is perceived to impose costs
on the Muslim community which is judged to be more traditionally
conservative and therefore negatively affected by the broader accep-
tance of liberal rights. Expressions of tolerance by the radical right are
invariably couched in terms linked to their perception of Muslims as
intolerant. Tolerance is not expressed independently, as a stand-alone
value in itself, without reference to Muslims. This strongly suggests the
expressed tolerance is strategic and perhaps not wholly sincere.1
In the next section, we provide further background on patterns of
tolerance and intolerance within wider society and the radical right.
We then outline a potential model for selective tolerance. We provide
empirical evidence from studies of two UK-based organisations, the
EDL and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and from
a study of Poland’s Law and Justice Party, to support our theory.
The article finishes with a brief conclusion.
Tolerance, stigma and the radical right
Tolerance may be defined as ‘respect for diversity’ (Corneo and
Jeanne, 2009: 691) and ‘openness, inclusiveness . . . to all ethnicities,
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races and walks of life’ (Florida, 2003: 10). As Berggren and Nilsson
(2013: 178) have noted, tolerance may be consistent with like and dis-
like, approval or disapproval, of those who are tolerated – the relevant
characteristic is that diversity is tolerated, not that it is liked or
meets approval.
Tolerance has been positively linked to economic growth (Andersen
and Fetner, 2008). Berggren and Elinder (2012) and Berggren and
Nilsson (2013, 2016) have found evidence of a positive relationship
between economic freedom and tolerance, particularly of homosexu-
ality. Given the evidence of a positive relationship between economic
growth and tolerance, and economic freedom and tolerance, it is
unsurprising that there is evidence of a general global trend towards
greater tolerance in recent decades that coincides with increasing
global prosperity and economic freedom (Berggren and Nilsson, 2015).
Another strand of research suggests that intolerance may be fuelled
by the opportunistic behaviour of political actors seeking to advance
their own personal interests. Contemporary radical right politicians
who seek to gain political advantage from intolerance must also
achieve reconciliation with the broadly tolerant context of the pros-
perous, open, liberal democratic societies in which they operate.
Previous studies have observed that radical right parties often utilise
tolerance for strategic reasons: to broaden their appeal among voters
(Almeida, 2017); to close the ‘radical right gender gap’ by appealing
more equally to men and women (Mayer, 2015); and, in the case of the
British National Party’s recruitment of Sikhs and fielding of ethnic
minority candidates, to ‘counter charges of anti-Semitism and
racism’ (Goodwin, 2010: 178). We agree that association with fascism
and Nazism may undermine a radical right organisation’s popular
legitimacy and that a radical right organisation that aims to recruit
male and female supporters would do well to have policies that appeal
to both sexes.
We contend that a radical right organisation may express tolerance
towards previous out-groups to reduce the level of stigma that society
imposes upon its members and supporters. In a generally tolerant,
liberal environment, to openly hold male chauvinist, homophobic, bio-
logically racist and Islamophobic views is to adopt a highly stigmatised
position. For many individuals, the costs of such stigma may be so
great that they will outweigh the benefits of supporting the organisa-
tion. Radical right organisations can reduce the burden of stigma by
modifying their public position across a number, but not all, of these
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dimensions: the organisation may publicly pronounce in favour of
women’s rights, LGBT people and some racial minorities, while main-
taining an Islamophobic position, and thereby significantly reduce the
costs of stigma. While support is often expressed for women, LGBT
people and Jews, radical right organisations do not advocate for all
historic out-groups, with Black people and gypsies/travellers being
notable omissions. One reason is that such universal tolerance would
essentially unravel what it means to be a radical right group. A radical
right group, if not intolerant of all out-groups, must be intolerant of at
least one out-group. But which out-group? Because more recent polit-
ical history identifies Islam as salient and perceived as the principal
threat by radical right groups, it is targeted as an out-group.2
The contextual factors that underpin selective tolerance are there-
fore more complex than mere political appeal and stigma reduction.
An out-group must be available upon which intolerance can be tar-
geted, which simultaneously allows the group to reduce stigma, broad-
en appeal and yet still hold true to what it means to be a radical right
group. Crucially, radical right groups express tolerance towards pre-
vious out-groups with reference to Islam’s alleged intolerance of these
groups. It seems rare that radical right groups make statements calling
for LGBT rights, gender equality and so on independent of referring to
Islam. As Spierings and Zaslove (2015: 143) describe, gender- and
LGBT-equality may have become Islamophobic tools so that ‘atti-
tudes regarding gender equality and lesbian and gay emancipa-
tion . . .might be associated with the nativist, anti-immigration, anti-
Islam agenda in a mutually reinforcing manner’. This relationship of
mutual reinforcement underpins selective intolerance and provides a
powerful tool that can be used to explain why radical right organisa-
tions only display tolerance towards certain historic out-groups, and
why radical right organisations operating in contexts where there is not
a significant concern about stigma do not display selective tolerance
but continue to express intolerant views towards a multitude of
traditional out-groups.
Modelling selective tolerance
The model to be presented here follows Glaeser’s (2005) political econ-
omy model of hatred. In Glaeser’s core model, pro-redistribution and
anti-redistribution politicians compete for votes. If the out-group is
generally poor relative to the in-group (e.g. Blacks in the American
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south in the late 19th and early 20th centuries), anti-redistribution
politicians will have an incentive to spread hate about the out-group.
Why? Because if relatively poor voters (e.g. working-class Whites in
the American south) believe the hate stories, they may vote for an anti-
redistribution politician who would economically weaken the poor
out-group. In this way, some relatively poor in-group voters decide
to vote for the anti-redistribution politician although they would have
been better off voting for a pro-redistribution politician in the absence
of an out-group, or if they believed the out-group to be harmless.
Given that they believe a harmful out-group to exist, the gains from
weakening them (by reducing their resources) and the harm they can
do outweighs the resource gains that would have accrued from voting
for a pro-redistribution politician. In this way, the anti-redistribution
politician can expand their support base beyond the relatively well-off,
by spreading hate stories about a relatively poor out-group. Glaeser
argues that the logic is the same if an out-group is perceived as rich
such as Jews. Then, pro-redistribution parties can obtain support from
relatively wealthy members of the in-group who support taxing and
weakening the hated rich out-group.3
Glaeser acknowledges that the policy dimension and the issues that
divide in-group from out-group need not be economic and this is the
angle that will be explored here. In particular, the focus here is on two
out-groups with views that potentially conflict even more sharply
between each other than they do with the in-group. As a result, the
policy dimension to be politically contested may specifically regard
rights accruing to one of the out-groups. As rights increase (thus help-
ing one of the out-groups), the other out-group, in response, may be
made worse off. So, for example, suppose the policy focus is on LGBT
rights. An increase in LGBT rights while obviously strengthening the
LGBT out-group may also serve to weaken members of a socially
conservative out-group such as traditional Muslims who prefer
group-based, multicultural rights to trump the granting of individual
rights such as gay marriage. In this case, a radical right politician who
is relatively socially liberal will have an incentive to spread lies about
the conservative out-group. Note that we are analysing the internal
competition of a radical right party, so the relatively liberal politician
will still be considered far from liberal in terms of the preferences of
wider society. They are liberal compared to their fellow radical right
members. If the lies are not investigated by a proportion of the radical
right membership, a subset of these members who are conservative
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may vote for a more liberal politician. The meaning of a lie here would
be that Muslims wish to inflict damage on society which would include
the radical right members. Damage could be that all Muslims are
terrorists who wish to impose sharia law on society. Although they
would not otherwise wish to see the extension of individual rights, they
perceive the Muslim conservative out-group as harmful and will be
made less harmful by a society which prioritises individual over
group-based rights. So long as the perceived weakening of the
Muslim conservative out-group provides benefits that outweigh the
cost of a more liberal society, then relatively more conservative radical
right members will have an incentive to support relatively liberal rad-
ical right politicians. In this way an attempt to align with LGBT causes
is driven by the perception that LGBT people are less of a threat
compared to the Muslim community. Part of the fear of the Muslim
community is a fear of multiculturalism which is more unifying than
the fear of LGBT causes.
In terms of the distinction we have been highlighting between tra-
ditional radical right groups with widely dispersed intolerance towards
a range of out-groups and radical right groups containing a more
concentrated intolerance towards a specific out-group, the following
model can be viewed in this way. Again, suppose the traditional radical
right group is feeling pressure due to social stigma emanating from
wider society. They have two goals. They need to retain membership
by reducing stigma, but still constitute the identity of a radical right
group which requires intolerance of an out-group even if intolerance of
all out-groups is no longer possible. A way to satisfy both aims is to
attack the traditional conservative out-group (say the Muslim commu-
nity) for being hostile towards liberal causes (say LGBT rights). In this
way, the reduction in stigma may allow retention of relatively liberal
radical right group members (although they are unlikely to be consid-
ered liberal by wider society) because they feel the pressure of social
stigma more keenly than the more conservative members of the radical
right group. Wider society while stigmatising intolerance of all groups
may be focused more on stigmatising intolerance of groups that
hold modern, liberal values than groups that hold more traditional,
conservative values. In addition, the group by attacking the Muslim
community on the basis of their perceived hostility to liberal rights
allows the radical right group to be more cohesive. Traditional, con-
servative members of the radical right group (who are likely to be less
concerned about social stigma) can be persuaded to support the
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strategy of being selectively liberal (who would not support the
strategy otherwise) as it still allows for the intolerance (against
Muslims) that is essential to be a radical right group and they
view the strategy as hurting the Muslim community. In this sense
they are analogous to the poor White voters in Glaeser’s application
who support anti-redistribution candidates in the presence of a per-
ceived threat from a poor out-group, which they would otherwise
not support. The necessity to appeal to wider society also explains
why the radical right would choose to align with a liberal social
cause, although on social issues they may be closer to the Muslim
conservative out-group.
The model follows that of Glaeser with modifications. There are
two out-groups, the LGBT and Muslim communities, but we will
focus only on the potential harm that can be done by Muslims.
Policy towards the LGBT community will provide the focus for polit-
ical competition. Muslims are harmful with probability h and harmless
with probability 1 – h. Harm could be viewed as a belief that the
Muslim community wish to engage in terrorism and impose Islamic
values upon society. If harmless, no such collective desire exists to do
this, in any serious form, within the Muslim community. If harmless,
the radical right will suffer no damage but if they are harmful will
suffer damage equal to d – (xP – xC)2, where d > 0, xP is the radical
right policy towards rights and xC is the ideal approach to rights from
the perspective of the Muslim community. The squared term equalises
positive and negative deviations from xC. Damage is the disutility that
would be caused by terrorism and/or the imposition of Islamic values.
In this formulation, the damage that can be caused by Muslims
towards the radical right is reduced the further that policy is from xC.
We assume that d ðxP  xCÞ2  0. Signals of potential harm can be
received either because Muslims are actually harmful, or as a result of
lies spread by radical right politicians and the source of the signal is
unclear. We do not consider the scenario in which Muslims are actually
harmful, as we wish to address the possibility of increased intolerance
towards Muslims being connected to increased tolerance towards the
LGBT community in a setting where intolerance is not justified by their
actually being harmful. We assume for simplicity that spreading lies is
costless for radical right politicians and, therefore, all such politicians
will do it. As a result, if a false signal is sent by a radical right politician
and received by members of the radical right, members believe that the
group is harmful with probability h.
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Glaeser considers costs of self-protection from potentially harmful
groups. Here, we consider psychological costs which we label d.
The idea here is that lack of trust in the Muslim community can be
a source of distress. Trust can be established by discovering that the
Muslim out-group is, in fact, harmless. The larger is d the larger the
distress. Having received a signal, in-group members decide whether to
investigate if the signal is true. For that they incur a cost s which is
randomly distributed. Whether the search is conducted is determined
by the expected gain of undertaking it. If no search is conducted, the
expected cost is hðd ðxP  xCÞ2Þ þ d. If the search is conducted,
the expected cost is hðd ðxP  xCÞ2 þ dÞ. Therefore, search is only
conducted if
dð1 hÞ > s (1)
High psychological costs caused by d will incentivise search, as will
having a low s. The latter might be caused by education, but the pres-
ence of d captures the idea that even if someone has a low s they may
not search if d is low or even negative. These individuals may enjoy
feelings of distrust towards the out-group.4 For others though, a fail-
ure to search may simply be that it is too costly. Search is also likely if
h is small. The share of the radical right membership that will search is
therefore given by Hðdð1 hÞÞ. So, the share of the group that will not
investigate the truth is 1Hðdð1 hÞÞ.
Glaeser considered income (y) as the policy issue such that if a tax
rate is proposed, an individual with income y will pay sðy ŷÞ in tax
where s is the tax rate and ŷ is average income. If one politician argues
for higher s, the relatively wealthy will pay more tax under this pro-
posal and relatively poor individuals will receive a greater subsidy.
Here, instead the fight will be over rights. Ignoring hatred a radical
right member i will support the radical right politician proposing con-
servative group rights so long as ðxi  xconÞ2 < ðxi  xlibÞ2, where xcon
and xlib are the positions of the relatively conservative and liberal
radical right politicians, respectively. This simply says that the radical
right group member, in the absence of hatred, would support the
politician offering a position on rights that is closest to their own.
The indifferent group member x̂ would be such that
x̂ ¼ 1
2
xcon þ xlibð Þ (2)
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If we assume that xlib < xcon, the proportion of support within the
group for the liberal politician is Fðx̂Þ.
The existence of hatred may change the direction of support for
certain types of radical right members. If lies have been spread and
not investigated by some group members, then there is a belief that
Muslims could do harm to society. However, policy proposals made by
the competing politicians may reduce this harm and crucially the pol-
itician who proposes the policy that will weaken Muslims the most will
have a competitive advantage. To see this, suppose reasonably enough
that the radical right is on average a traditionally socially conservative
group but that Muslims are, on average, even more socially conserva-
tive and less keen on the extension of individual rights. A policy that
extends individual rights would weaken Muslims in the event that
they are harmful.5 Someone who chooses not to investigate the hate
message (the haters) will support the politician arguing for relatively
liberal policies if
ðxi  xconÞ2 þ hðd ðxcon  xCÞ2Þ > ðxi  xlibÞ2 þ hðd ðxlib  xCÞ2Þ
(3)
We can see that for some group members, who would in the absence
of hatred have chosen a socially conservative policy, will in the pres-
ence of hatred choose a more liberal approach to rights. The reason is
that the benefit of the relatively greater damage that this policy inflicts
upon the socially conservative Muslim out-group outweighs the loss in
terms of an approach to rights that is further from their ideal point.
In this way, a more liberal approach which recommends extending
individual rights to the LGBT community could be combined with
hate messages aimed at Muslims. If the hate messages are believed,
the relatively liberal radical right politician within the group will no
longer just collect support from other relatively liberal group members.
In addition, they can pick up additional support from relatively social-
ly conservative group members who see a liberal extension of rights as
a way of weakening the Muslim out-group that they fear. Among
those that hate the indifferent group member x̂h has preferences that
are more conservative than x̂ (in equation (2)) as shown by
x̂h ¼ 1
2
xcon þ xlib þ h 2xC  xcon  xlibð Þ
 
(4)
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We can see that x̂h > x̂ given that 2xC  xcon  xlib > 0, which
follows from the assumption that xC is further from xlib than xcon.
The additional support to be gained by spreading hate is ð1Hðdð1
hÞÞÞðFðx̂hÞ  Fðx̂ÞÞ which is positive because Fðx̂hÞ  Fðx̂Þ > 0.
If the out-group were to become more conservative (xC increases),
x̂h increases and the incentive to spread hate by the radical right liberal
politician increases. This reflects the fact that in the mind of the haters,
the liberal politician can inflict even greater damage on the Muslim
out-group as the distance between them and Muslims becomes even
greater. If h increases, hate increases. The reason is that if the proba-
bility of the out-group actually being harmful increases, there is less
incentive to search to see if the hate messages are true. If d increases hate
decreases, this reflects an increasing psychological discomfort from feel-
ing distrust towards Muslims. This could be related to closer integration
of groups. Finally, if s increases across the in-group, hate increases
because search for the truth is costlier. This could be related to educa-
tion and/or levels of integration.
We emphasise that social stigma plays a key role here, though it is
hidden. The false messages are aimed at Muslims only and this would
happen when, for example, homophobia or sexism is highly socially
stigmatised. The reason is that the relatively more liberal members
of the radical right would be feeling the pressure of social stigma.
This pressure could be felt, for example, in job market concerns, that
if viewed as homophobic they would be discriminated against (Becker,
1971). In addition, recruitment will be easier for the radical right if
highly stigmatised views are suppressed. Were homophobia and
sexism not stigmatised, we would also expect false messages to be sent
about gender equality and the LGBT community. To that extent, false
messages from within the different spectrums of the radical right group
would tend to counteract and perhaps neutralise each other. The focus
on one group (in this case Muslims) stems from an environment where
less social stigma is attached to attacking this out-group than other
traditional out-groups. Formally, we could think of this being captured
by differences in the receipt of hate messages with reference to equation
(1). For example, if a hate message is received about the LGBT com-
munity in a society where homophobia is highly socially stigmatised, d
may be higher and h and s lower than for Muslims, thus inducing much
greater search for the truth than for false messages concerning Muslims.
We now turn to case studies to provide evidence for this mechanism in
the context of intolerance towards Muslims.
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Case studies
If our analysis is correct, then we would not expect to see a radical
right group couch its Islamophobia in liberal values if it is operating in
a society in which little or no stigma attaches to intolerant views.
However, we would expect to observe a radical right organisation
expressing selective tolerance when: (1) expressing tolerance may be
a means of reducing the stigma attached to their other intolerant views
and (2) expressing tolerance will impose costs on Muslims. We would
also predict that as a radical right organisation begins to champion the
causes of former out-groups, its anti-Islam rhetoric will increase.
Indeed, its championing of former out-groups is couched in relation
to its negative depiction of Islam and not in isolation from it.
We will examine these hypotheses via analysis of case studies from
contemporary Polish and UK politics. Poland historically has a patri-
archal culture and there remains a strong commitment to traditional
gender roles. Women’s emancipation is associated with state interven-
tion during the socialist era and therefore became discredited in the
post-socialist period (Lehoczky, 2005; Saxonberg and Szelewa, 2007).
The cost of holding homophobic views may be lowered by the lack of
legislation that allows prosecution for homophobic hate speech;
although the Polish Penal Code does include some provisions
related to hate speech, neither sexual orientation nor gender identity
are protected characteristics (Article 19, 2018). In addition, Poland’s
Constitution does not explicitly contain provisions that prohibit advo-
cating hatred ‘that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility,
or violence’ (Article 19, 2018: 17). Same-sex marriage is prohibited and
there are widespread levels of homophobia, with 42.5% of Polish
respondents to the World Values Survey (2015) agreeing that homo-
sexuality can never be justified. Poland is also the most anti-Semitic
country in Eastern Europe (Anti-Defamation League, 2015).
Finally, there are extensive levels of Islamophobia, with 67% of
respondents reporting antipathy to Arab people (CBOS Public
Opinion Research Centre, 2016). Given the evidence of intolerance
towards all out-groups, we would not expect a political organisation
to broaden its appeal or reduce stigma by championing the causes of
any minority. Intolerant actors within Poland will not be forced to
make a trade-off; there is no need for a radical right organisation to
express tolerance towards LGBT people or Jews in order to express
intolerance towards Islam.
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However, the UK population is increasingly tolerant towards the
radical right’s historic out-groups. A 2015 poll from the Pew Research
Centre found that 7% of UK respondents had an unfavourable view of
Jews. Workplace discrimination against women in the United
Kingdom is outlawed and, although a gender pay gap still exists, it
has narrowed in recent years (OECD, 2017). There is also increased
tolerance for homosexuality: although 74% of respondents in 1987
agreed that same-sex relationships were ‘always’ or ‘mostly’ wrong,
that number dropped to 19% by 2016 (British Social Attitudes,
2016: 4). The cost of engaging in homophobic practices or expressing
homophobic views has increased since the UK Parliament outlawed
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in 2007. The fol-
lowing year it became illegal to express homophobic hatred.
Clements and Field (2014: 543) note that increasingly liberal atti-
tudes towards homosexuality ‘aligns with growing popular support in
Britain for equality and diversity in all forms, but particularly in rela-
tion to gender, race, and religion’. The social research agency NatCen
has found a significant and steady reduction in the percentage of
respondents who say that they ‘would “mind a lot” or “mind a little”
if a close relative married someone who was Black or Asian’
(Kelley et al., 2017: 10). NatCen has also observed that views on
gender roles – measured by asking whether respondents agreed that
it is a man’s job to earn money and woman’s job to look after the
home and family – have become more progressive over time and par-
ticularly since 2008 (Phillips et al., 2018). Although there has been a
troubling rise of anti-Semitic incidents reported throughout Europe,
recent YouGov (2017) polling within the United Kingdom found that
81% of respondents agreed it was fair to administer a lifetime game
ban to football fans who made Nazi gestures which suggests that
expressions of anti-Semitism are stigmatised.
However, Clements and Field (2014) also observe that an exception
to the broader trend of tolerance is Islamophobia, which has grown as
intolerance towards other historic out-groups has decreased.
Islamophobia in the United Kingdom increased after the 9/11 and
7/7 terrorist attacks, and a YouGov (2016) poll found that over half
of respondents agreed there is a fundamental clash between the values
of Islam and British society. Therefore, a radical right organisation
that expresses tolerance towards previous out-groups while also advo-
cating for Islamophobia will plausibly attain broader appeal and
encounter less stigma than a consistently intolerant party. This is
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particularly so given the increased political salience of Islam: in 2000
survey evidence showed that only 17% of UK respondents were
unwilling to accept any people from Muslim countries who wished
to work in the European Union (Field, 2007: 452); however, a 2017
survey revealed that 47% of UK respondents agreed that ‘[a]ll further
migration from mostly Muslim countries should be stopped’
(Goodwin et al., 2017).
Poland and broad intolerance
Since 2015, Poland has been governed by the Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, or
Law and Justice (PiS), a populist right party that has called to preserve
the Polish nation through traditional Catholic values (Gwiazda, 2016).
After winning an unprecedented majority, PiS has sought to weaken core
democratic institutions such as the media and Constitutional Court
(Bustikova, 2018). We hypothesise that if PiS’s local operating context
is not broadly tolerant, the party will not display selective tolerance.
Instead, we would expect intolerant actors to express intolerance towards
all out-groups, including Islam, and we would not expect criticism of
Islam to be couched in support of liberal values.
Public statements of PiS representatives support this hypothesis.
PiS’s foreign minister expressed biological racism when criticising the
previous government for having promoted ‘a new mixture of cultures
and races’ (Easton, 2016). The European Jewish Council has warned
that anti-Semitism in Poland has been normalised and that anti-
Semitic incidents have increased since PiS closed communications
with official representatives of the Jewish community (Halon, 2017).
In the lead-up to the 2019 election, PiS’s Chair, Jaroslaw Kaczynski,
maintained that LGBT rights threatened Polish values and families
(Easton, 2019). The party also release a campaign advertisement that
featured a PiS-branded umbrella shielding a family from rainbow-
coloured rain (Noak, 2019).
In addition, PiS displays Islamophobia. Consistent with its calls to
uphold traditional Catholic values, PiS have attacked Islam and claimed
it may harm Poland’s religious identity, with Kaczynski, stating:
[Muslims] do not follow our laws and customs and then impose their
sensitivity and requirements in public space in various areas of life.
And in a very aggressive and violent way . . .Let’s look at Sweden, the
54 zones where sharia is in force. Fears of hanging the Swedish flag at
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schools because there is a cross. Swedish students are not allowed to
wear short dresses because they do not like it . . .What’s going on in
Italy? Stained churches, treated as toilets. (Niezalezna, 2015)
Rather than criticising Islam for oppressing women, LGBT people and
Jews, PiS attack Islam primarily on the grounds that it may pose a
security threat, harm Poland’s Catholic identity and threaten the fem-
ininity of women rather than their rights.
Radical right organisations in Poland have also attracted tens of
thousands of people to their street-based protests which promote a
homophobic, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic ideology. The All-
Polish Youth, an ultra-Catholic nationalist organisation with an
anti-Semitic history, is a co-organiser of the Polish Independence
Day march. In 2017, the march attracted a near-record 60,000 partic-
ipants and included the chanting of anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim and
anti-gay slogans (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2017; Taylor, 2017). Because
the All-Polish Youth is not operating in a broadly tolerant environ-
ment, it will not have to couch its prejudice in liberal values to attract
support and can express opposition to historic out-groups without fear
of jeopardising its base.
The United Kingdom and selective tolerance
The UKIP was founded in 1993 with the intention of contesting
elections to secure the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the
European Union (Usherwood, 2008). However, single-issue
Euroscepticism was not enough to drive voters towards the party.
To increase its share, UKIP developed ‘a more concerted vote-
seeking strategy’, with its leader, Nigel Farage, seeking to merge
Europe and immigration in the minds of voters (Ford and Goodwin,
2014: 282; Tournier-Sol, 2015).
As the party has moved to a platform more closely associated with
the populist, radical right it has been dogged by increasing allegations
of racism and xenophobia. UKIP has been more successful in attract-
ing voters who are less likely to view non-White citizens as British and
more likely to view Islam as a serious danger to Western civilisation
than any other major UK party (Ford et al., 2012; Goodhart, 2014).
In addition, there have been numerous high-profile racist, sexist and
homophobic gaffes associated with the party (Hatakka et al., 2017;
Kaufmann, 2014).
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Ford et al. (2012) identified the dilemma that may precede the adop-
tion of selective tolerance when they recognised that
[I]f UKIP continues to put strong emphasis on divisive issues such as
immigration and Islam then it risks alienating strategic supporters who
are primarily motivated to defect from the Conservatives by their
Euroscepticism. In the future, much will depend upon how the party
manages this difficult trade-off. (p. 228)
We take the view that UKIP attempted to navigate the trade-off via
the strategic considerations that underpin selective tolerance and con-
tend that the party has expressed tolerance to reduce the stigma
attached to their other intolerant views and to impose costs on
Muslims.
A YouGov (2015) poll found that 55% of UKIP voters would be
embarrassed to tell their family and friends about their voting inten-
tions. There is stigma attached to open endorsement of UKIP which
may have been fostered by its anti-immigrant rhetoric and the sexist
and homophobic comments by its candidates and councillors.
Expressing tolerance for historic out-groups may be a way to minimise
the stigma associated with UKIP support.
We would expect UKIP to justify its intolerance towards Muslims
in accordance with liberal values. Its 2017 General Election manifesto
states that ‘UKIP will ban wearing of the niqab and the burqa in
public places . . .We will not accept these de-humanising symbols of
segregation and oppression . . . ’ and claims that ‘anyone who believes
in women’s rights, should be outraged by the appalling practices
occurring on a daily basis in minority communities across Britain’
(UKIP, 2017: 36, 37). The manifesto quotes UKIP’s LGBT chair,
who claims that ‘[t]hose of us who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender may have first-hand experience of how misogynistic
and homophobic attitudes are tolerated in the name of “respecting
cultural differences” ‘(UKIP, 2017: 37). In addition, the manifesto
requests Ofsted, the UK regulator of schools and colleges, to conduct
inspections of schools where staff or governors are believed to espouse
‘anti-Semitic . . . views’ as part of UKIP’s policy to end Islamist extrem-
ism in schools (UKIP, 2017: 38).
As UKIP’s defence of women, LGBT people and Jews has
increased, so too has its Islamophobia. Its 2001 General Election man-
ifesto contained no relevant references to the former out-groups or to
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Muslims but reflected its essentially Eurosceptic nature with 228 refer-
ences to the European Union. By contrast, its 2017 manifesto con-
tained 16 references to Islam and Muslims, 29 references to women,
12 references to Female Genital Mutilation, two references to LGBT
people and one reference to anti-Semitism, while its references to the
European Union dropped to 153. It seems that when Islam was not
politically salient, neither were women, gays or Jews.
In the aftermath of the 2016 UK referendum vote to leave the
European Union and their dismal performance in the 2017 General
Election, UKIP intensified their hostile focus on Islam to such an
extent that in December 2018, Nigel Farage resigned as a party
member in protest at the appointment of former EDL leader
Tommy Robinson as a party adviser. Statements made by the
party’s leadership reveal that its anti-Islam stance is premised on
more than a rejection of multiculturalism and instead suggests that
the party is seeking to inflame antipathy towards Muslims through
the spreading of hate; one of Farage’s successors, Gerard Batten,
described Islam as a ‘death cult’ in an interview with Sky News
(2018) and stated that, ‘[t]he ideology of the religion does actually
traditionally throughout its history make sex slaves legitimate.
Their prophet had sex slaves . . . It’s in the Hadith and the Koran.
It’s a tradition that that’s okay to do that’.
The EDL, a street-based protest organisation founded in 2009 to
oppose the spread of radical Islam in the United Kingdom, is also
selectively tolerant. The EDL has a female division for its members
and from the outset emphasised that it is a multicultural organisation
that includes Sikh, Jewish and LGBT people (Allen, 2011). From July
2010 to November 2011, the EDL held almost monthly protests that
attracted between 500 and 2000 participants. At many of these
demonstrations participants carried rainbow or Israeli flags and
encouraged the attendance of Sikhs, while engaging in anti-Muslim
chanting. We argue that the EDL’s promotion of women, LGBT
people, Sikhs and Jews is the result of the strategic considerations of
selective tolerance.
Meadowcroft and Morrow (2017) have observed that EDL partic-
ipation is a stigmatised activity with much of the encountered stigma
being derived from the public perception that the group is racist. In a
bid to challenge this perception, many EDL members were at pains to
portray themselves as anti-racist and tolerant of minority groups.
This would often be done by members claiming to have family and
160 Rationality and Society 32(2)
friends of different races or, as one young member put it, ‘I’m not
racist. I don’t have a problem with Sikhs or Hindus or Jews or gays
and lesbians’ (Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2017: 384).
Original ethnographic data reveals that EDL leaders additionally
promoted the organisation’s inclusion of historic out-groups to pro-
vide a rebuttal to people who might accuse participants of racism.
At one meet and greet session for new members, EDL leaders told
the audience that the EDL has divisions for Jews, Sikhs and LGBT
people and that ‘if anyone says that the EDL are racist you should the
let other person know that there is a division for all different religions’.
As our model anticipates, the EDL’s tolerance of women, LGBT
people and Jews enables the organisation to simultaneously impose
costs on Islam by singling out the religion for its alleged illiberalness
and intolerance. Speakers at EDL demonstrations warned the audi-
ence that if Islamists ‘have their way gays and Jews will be stoned and
so will women’. In addition, the EDL’s mission statement claims that
‘other expressions of Islam-inspired intolerance . . . include: denigration
and oppression of women, organised sexual abuse of children, female
genital mutilation, so-called honour killings, homophobia, racism,
anti-Semitism’ (EDL, 2016). Like UKIP, the EDL (2011) specifically
targets adherents of the Islamic faith via inflamatory rhetoric, with the
organisation’s website stating,
The importance of identifying Islam as a major contributing factor is
demonstrated by the arrests for child-grooming that have recently swept
across the country . . .many Muslim men see little wrong with applying
the example of the prophet (sex with young children) to those who they
regard as ‘dirty kuffar’.
The strategic nature of the EDL’s selective tolerance is revealed in its
reluctance to advocate for all historic out-groups. The organisation
does not have a designated division for black members, despite
having divisions for ethnic minorities, such as Sikhs, that are far less
significant in terms of the UK population. It seems plausible that the
EDL does not have a division for Black members because advocating
for Black people would not impose costs on Muslims.
The strategic considerations that underpin the EDL’s selective tol-
erance are not lost on the organisation’s supporters. This is illuminated
by an exchange on the anti-Islam ‘Gates of Vienna’ blog after its post-
ing of the EDL’s mission statement. One poster contended, ‘And here’s
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the problem with the “Counter-Jihad” movement: it’s all built on the
basis of being opposed to something, rather than being for something.
Geert Wilders bases his opposition to Islam around abstract ideas like
freedom, but really, what does that mean? Does that mean we oppose
Islam so we can have our gay marriages, pot smoking, and abortion-
on-demand?’ In response, another poster observed: ‘. . .You make
some pertinent points. My argument is that “purity” will follow
change, and that in the meantime any action that brings whites togeth-
er in common cause against the establishment is good – even if it is
“tainted”’.6 This exchange suggests that selective tolerance can be used
as a tool by a radical right organisation to maintain and expand its
supporter base. However, if tolerance is extended too broadly, this
may undermine the radical right organisation’s raison d’etre and alien-
ate supporters.
Conclusion
This article has set out an explanation for the selective tolerance exhib-
ited by contemporary radical right organisations. Where intolerant
views are stigmatised, radical right organisations have sought to
reduce this stigma by expressing tolerance towards some historic
out-groups. Where intolerant views do not encounter stigma, there is
little evidence of selective tolerance. Where radical right organisations
exhibit tolerance, it cannot be expressed universally. Such broad
expression of tolerance would essentially undermine the rationale for
being in a radical right group. So, at least one group must be subject to
intolerance. In addition to reducing stigma, it is advantageous if the
sort of tolerance that is expressed by the intolerant imposes costs upon
the targeted out-group. Where such selective tolerance is witnessed, in
recent times Muslims are the chosen out-group and support for the
rights of women, LGBT people and the Jewish community is judged to
both detoxify the radical right group and impose costs on Muslims.
One can speculate what might happen if the current climate were to
change in Western Europe and Muslims became less salient as the
obvious out-group to target. Would there be a return to broad intol-
erance? Or would a tolerance for traditional Islam be fostered as a
tactic to target alternative out-groups such as Jews or the LGBT com-
munity? Indeed, one might argue as Cohen (2007) has, that it is this
sort of selective tolerance that is characteristic of radical left rather
than radical right groups. In these cases, tolerance for groups that one
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would not normally associate with radical left causes has arguably
occurred because these groups are anti-US and/or anti-Israel.
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1. A feature of this trade-off is that where intolerance of LGBT rights is not
stigmatised, the radical right may be intolerant of LGBT people as well.
This inevitably though reduces the disutility imposed upon Muslims if they,
in turn, hold intolerant views of LGBT people. Intolerance of Muslims is
instead couched in different terms, for example, as anti-Christian or in
racist terms.
2. This does not imply that the radical right does not genuinely see Islam as
the enemy. Attacking Islam is not strategic, but claims of toleration towards
previously vilified out-groups may be.
3. For a recent paper which also uses an economic model to analyse the rela-
tionship between in-groups and out-groups, see Snower and Bosworth
(2016).
4. Bakker et al. (2016) find evidence that a low score on the personality trait
Agreeableness is related to voting for populist parties. Low Agreeableness
could be viewed as similar to low or negative d.
5. Glaeser modelled increasing income of out-group members as positively
correlated with the damage they can inflict on the in-group. He acknowl-
edges that some would argue that increased wealth would actually reduce
the threat. However, he argues that those who truly hate the out-group
generally believe that additional resources would increase the threat.
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Likewise, in the approach taken here we argue that a move towards indi-
vidual and away from group rights weakens Muslims. Some would argue
the opposite may be true as Muslims feel victimised by the action of the in-
group; they actually pose a greater threat. However, among those that truly
hate the same argument applies. Haters would believe that giving socially
conservative Muslims what they want and strengthening group-based rights
would increase the threat from Muslims.
6. Comments on Gates of Vienna blog, 15 January 2011.
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